This paper examines the concept of a combi nation rule for belief functions. It is shown that two fairly simple and apparently reason able assumptions determine Dempster's rule, giving a new justification for it.
INTRODUCTION
Dempster's rule is the cornerstone of Dempster-Shafer Theory, the theory of uncertainty developed by Shafer [76a] from the work of Dempster [67] . The rule is used to combine the representations of a number of inde pendent evidences, to achieve a combined measure of belief. For the theory to be able give meaningful con clusions, it is essential that Dempster's rule is con vincingly justifi ed. The rule and its justifications have been criticised from many angles, a common criticism being that it can be hard to know when evidences are independent, and indeed, what 'independence' means here.
In this paper an axiomatic approach to the combina tion of belief functions is taken. The concept of a com bination rule is formulated precisely, and assumptions are made which determine a unique rule, Dempster's rule. A benefi t of this approach is that it makes the in dependence or irrelevance assumptions explicit. Since the assumptions are arguably reasonable this gives a justification of the rule. This justifi cation is quite dif ferent from previous justifi cations of the complete rule, though it is related to the justification in [Wilson, 89, 92c ] of Dempster's rule for a collection of simple sup port functions.
In section 2, the mathematical framework is intro duced; in section 3, the concept of a combination rule is defined; section 4 discusses Dempster's rule and some of the problems with previous justifications of the rule; section 5 defines Bayesian conditioning, used for rep resenting one of the assumptions; the assumptions on rules of combination are defined and discussed in sec tion 6, and the main result of the paper, that they determine Dempster's rule, is given.
SOURCE STRUCTURESAND BELIEF FUNCTIONS
In this section the basic concepts are introduced. The mathematical framework is essentially that of [Demp ster, 67] with different notation (and minor differences) but some fundamental issues are considered in greater detail.
SOME BASIC CONCEPTS
We will be interested in sets of propositions and con sidering measures of belief over these.
Definition: Fr ame
A frame is defined to be a finite set1• Without loss of generality, it will be assumed that frames are subsets of the set of natural numbers,2 IN.
The intended interpretation of a frame is a set of mu tually exclusive and exhaustive propositions. Then the set of subsets of a frame 0, written as 2°, is a boolean algebra of propositions.
1'Frame' is an abbreviation for Shafer's term 'frame of discernment' [Shafer, 76a] ; [Dempster 67, 68] and [Shafer, 79] allow fr ames to be infinite; however the results here only apply to fi nite fr ames of discernment.
2 Actually any other infinite set would do; this is just to ensure that the collection of all multiple source structures (defi ned later) is a set.
Definition: (Additive) Probability Function
Let 0 be a frame. P is said to be a probability function over 0 if P is a function from 2° to [ 0, 1] such that (i) P(O) = 1, and (ii) (additivity) for all A, B � 0 such that An B = 0, P(A U B) = P(A) + P(B).
We are interested in the propositions in 2°, for frame e. Dempster, in his key paper [Dempster, 67] consid ers a situation where we have a probability function over a related frame 0 representing Bayesian beliefs.
Definition: Source Structure A source structure3 S over frame e is a triple (0, P, I), where n and e are frames (known as the underlying frame and fr ame of interest respectively) P (known as the underlying probability fu nction) is a proba bility function over 0, and compatibility function I (Dempster's multi-valued mapping) is a function fr om 0 to 2°. Furthermore, fo r w E 0, if I(w) :::: 0, then P(w) == 0.
The interpretation of Sis as follows. The set of propo sitions we are interested in is 2°, but we have no un certain information directly about e. Instead we have a subjective additive measure of belief P over 0, and a logical connection between the frames given by I: we know that, for w E 0, if w is true, then I(w) is also true. Here it is assumed that P is made with knowl edge of I.
The reason for the last condition in the defi nition is that if w is true then I(w) is true; however, if I(w) :::: 0 then, since 0 is the contradictory proposition, w cannot be true, so must be assigned zero probability.
Since it is frame e that we are interested in, we need to extend our uncertain information about 0 to 2°. Associated with the source structure S is a belief func tion and mass fu nction over e (see [Shafer, 76a] for the definitions of these terms) defined, for X � e by m 8 (X) = L P(w)
wE!l:J(w)!";X Bel 8 is the extension of the uncertain information given by P, via the compatibility fu nction I, to the frame e. It is viewed as a subjective measure of belief over e, and is generally non-additive.
2.2

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN SOURCE STRUCTURES AND BELIEF FUNCTIONS
In his book, a mathematical theory of of evidence [Shafer, 76a] , Shafer re-interprets Dempster's frame-3 See also 'Dempster spaces' in [Hajek et al., 9'2 Each belieffunction has a unique associated mass fu nc tion, and vice versa. The fo cal elements of a belief function are the subsets of the frame which have non zero mass. Let us define the focal elements of a source structureS= (0, P, I) over e to be the subsets A of e such that I(w) ==A for some wE 0 such that P(w)#O. It can easily be seen that the set of fo cal elements of S is the same as the set of fo cal elements of Bel 8 .
From any belief fu nction Bel, one can generate a source structure by letting 0 be a set in 1-1 correspondence with the set of fo cal elements, and defining the under lying probability fu nction and compatibility fu nction in the obvious way.
Though the underlying fr ame may be more abstract than the frame of interest, the natural occurrences of belief functions generally seem to have an intrinsic un derlying fr ame. Even Shafer, who in his book does away with the underlying frame, uses a Dempster-type framework in later work, fo r example in his random codes justification of Dempster's rule.
2.3
EXTENSION TO DIFFERENT FRAMES OF INTEREST
It is assumed here that all the source structures we are interested in combining are over the same fr ame. This is not really a restriction since if they are over different fr ames, we can take a common refinement e of all the frames (see [Shafer, 76a, chapter 6] ). All the source structures can then be re-expressed as source structures over e' and we can proceed as before.
COMBINATION RULES
Crucial to Shafer's and Dempster's theories is combi nation of belief fu nctions/source structures. The idea is that the body of evidence is broken up into small, (intuitively) independent pieces, the impact of each individual piece of evidence is represented by a belief function, and the impact of the whole body of evidence is calculated by combining these belief functions using Dempster's rule.
Informally, a combination rule is a mapping which takes a collection of source structures and gives a source structure, which is intended to represent the combined effect of the collection; the combined mea sures of belief in propositions of interest can then be calculated. If possible we would like to make natural assumptions that determine a uniquely sensible com bination rule.
3.1
COMBINING SOURCE STRUCTURES
First a collection of source structures must be for mally represented. This is done using a multiple source structure.
Definition: Jl4ultiple Source Structures
A multiple source structure s over frame 0 is defined to be a function with finite domain '1/J" C IN, which maps each i E '1/J" to a source structure over 0; we write s( i) as the triple (Qi, Pi, I!).
There are some collections of source structures that give inconsistent information. This leads to the fol lowing definition, which is justified in section 6.
Definition: Combinable
Multiple source structures (over some frame) is said to be combinable if there exist Wi En: (for each i E '1/J") with P:(w;):f:O and n iE'I/I' I f(w;):f:0.
Definition: Combination Rule
Let C be the set of all combinable multiple source structures (over any frames). A combination rule II is defined to be a function with domain C such that, for sEC over frame 0, II(s) is a source structure over e.
THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF A COMBINATION RULE
It turns out that there are easy, natural choices for two of the three components of a combination rule, the two logical components. .
Definition
For multiple source structure s, (i) ns is defined to be niE.P ' n:. An element w of n· is a function with domain '1/J" such that w( i) E Of. The element w( i) will usually be written w;.
(ii) The compatibility function I8 is given by P(w) = n iE,P' lf (w;) . Let us interpret element w E n· as meaning that Wi is true for all i E ,p•. n• is exhaustive, since each Qi is exhaustive, and every combination is considered; the elements of n• are mutually exclusive since any two different ws differ in at least one co-ordinate i, and the elements of Of are mutually exclusive. Therefore we can use n• as the underlying frame for the combina tion. (Some of the elements of the product space may well be known to be impossible, using the compatibil ity functions, so a smaller underlying frame could be used, but this makes essentially no difference).
(ii) The Combined Compatibility Function
For w E n•) if w is true, then Wi ( E nn is true for each i E ¢•, which implies It (w;) is true for each i, so n ie ..P· It is true (since intersection of sets in 2e corre sponds to conjunction of propositions). Assuming we have no other information about dependencies between underlying frames, this is the strongest proposition we can deduce from w. Thus compatibility functions It generate compatibility function I" on n·.
(
iii) The Combined Underlying Probability Function
This is the hard part of the combination rule so it is convenient to consider this part on its own, defi ning a C-rule to be the third component of a combination rule.
Definition: C-rule
A C-rule 1r is defi ned to be a function, with domain the set of all combinable multiple source structures, which acts on a combinable multiple source structure s over some frame 0 and produces an additive probability function over Q$. We write the probability function
In this section Dempster's rule is expressed within the framework of this paper, and previous justifi cations are discussed.
4.1
DEMPSTER'S COMBINATION RULE AND C-RULE
Definition: the Dempster C-rule
The Dempster C-rule 7rDs is defi ned as follows. For combinable multiple source structure s, and w E 06, if P(w) = 0 then 7riJ8(w) = 0, else
where K is a constant (i.e., independent of w) chosen such that 7r iJ8(n•) = 1 (as it must for 7rvs to be a probability function).
Definition: the Dempster Combination Rule
The Dempster Combination Rule acts on multi ple source structure s to give source structure ( 0 6 ' 7rns• J6) .
It is easy to see that this is the combination rule used in [Dempster, 67] and corresponds to 'Dempster's rule' in (Shafer, 76a] .
Justification of Dempster's rule therefore amounts to justifying the Dempster C-rule 7rD S·
In section 6 the Dempster C-rule is justified by consid ering a set of constraints and assumptions on C-rules that determine a unique C-rule.
4.2
DISCUSSION OF JUSTIFICATIONS OF DEMPSTER'S RULE
Dempster's explanation of his rule in (Dempster, 67] amounts to assuming independence (so that for any w E 06' the propositions represented by Wj for i E 1/J' are considered to be independent) thus generating the product probability function P(w) == Ti i E 1fJ• Pi(wi), for w E n•. If I' ( w) is empty then w cannot be true, so P is then conditioned on the set {w : J'(w)¥:0}, leading to Dempster's rule.
This two stage process. of fi rstly assuming indepen dence, and then conditioning on I'(w) being non empty, needs to be justified. The information given by J• is a dependence between Wi for i E 1/;6, so they clearly should not be assumed to be independent if this dependence is known. Ruspini's justification [Ruspini, 87] also appears not to deal satisfactorily with this crucial point.
A major weakness of a mathematical theory of evidence is that the numerical measures of belief are not given a clear interpretation, and Dempster's rule is not prop erly justified. This is rectified in (Shafer, 81] with his random codes canonical examples.
Shafer's Random Codes Canonical Examples
Here the underlying frame n is a set of codes. An agent randomly picks a particular code w with chance P(w) and this code is used to encode a true statement, which is represented by a subset of some frame e. We know the set of codes and the chances of each being picked, but not the particular code picked, so when we receive the encoded message we decode it with each code w' E n in turn to yield a message J(w') (which is a subset of e for each w'). This situation corresponds to a source structure (0, P, J) over e.
This leads to the desired two stage process: for if there are a number of agents picking codes stochastically in dependently and encoding true (but possibly different) messages then the probability distributions are (at this stage) independent. Then if we receive all their mes sages and decode them we may find certain combina tions of codes are incompatible, leading to the second, conditioning, stage.
To use Shafer's theory to represent a piece of evidence, we choose the random codes canonical example (and associated source structure) that is most closely anal ogous to that piece of evidence. Two pieces of ev idences are considered to be independent if we can satisfactorily compare them to the picking of indepen dent random codes. However, in practice, it will often be very hard to say whether our evidences are analo gous to random codes canonical examples, and judging whether these random codes are independent may also be very hard, especially if the comparison is a rather vague one.5
Shafer's justification applies only when the underlying probability function has meaning independently of the compatibility function, that is, when the compatibil ity function is transitory (Shafer, 92] (see also [Wilson, 92b] for some discussion of this point). Many occur rences of belief functions are not of this form. The justification given in this paper opens up the possibil ity of justifying Dempster's rule for other cases.
The Non-Normalised Version of Dempster's Rule
The non-normalised version of Dempster's rule [Smets, 88, 92 ) is simpler mathematically so it is less hard to fi nd mathematical assumptions that determine it. However, whether these assumptions are reasonable or not is another matter. Smets considers that the un normalised rule applies when the frame is interpreted as a set of mutually exclusive propositions which are not known to be exhaustive. Such a frame can be rep resented by a conventional frame, by adding an extra element representing the proposition which is true if and only if all the other propositions (represented by 50ther criticisms of this justification are given in the various comments on [Shafer, 82a, 82b] , and in [Levi, 83] .
other elements of the frame) are false, thus restoring exhaustivity. Therefore Smets' non-exhaustive frames are unnecessary (and are restrictive).
Smets also attempts to justify (the normalised) Demp ster's rule using the unnormalised rule by 'closed-world conditioning' [Smets, 88] , i.e., combining the belief functions as if the frame was not known to be exhaus tive, and then conditioning on the frame being exhaus tive after all. This suffers from a similar problem to that faced by Dempster's justifi cation (see above dis cussion), and seems very unsatisfactory: if we know that the frame is exhaustive then this information should be taken into account at the beginning (and then Smets' justifi cation does not apply)-pretending temporarily that the frame is not exhaustive is per verse and liable to lead to unreliable results.
See also [Dubois and Prade, 86; Hajek, 92; Klawonn and Schwecke, 92] .
5
BAYESIAN CONDITIONING
In this section Bayesian conditioning of source structures6 is defined; these are used to simply express assumption (A) in section 6.
Definition: Bayesian Conditioning of a Probability Function
Let P be an (additive) probability function over set n, and let A � n be such that P(A);iO. Then the probability function P � over A. is defi ned by P(f) P�(f) = P(A) for r � A.
This is used for conditioning on certain evidence A. Note that if A is considered to be certain, and n is a frame, then A is also a frame.
Definition: Bayesian Conditioning of a Source Structure
Let S = (Q, P, I) be a source structure over frame 0 and let A � n (representing certain evidence) be such that P(A);iO. Then s� is defi ned to be the source structure (A, P �,I�), where I� is I restricted to A.
This should be uncontroversial, given that the judge ment of the underlying epistemic probability P is made with knowledge of the compatibility function.
Incidentally if, for source structure S = (0, P, I) over 0 and A � 0, we let A = {wEn : I(w) �A} then S � corresponds to geometric conditioning by A [Shafer, 76b; Suppes and Zanotti, 77] .
6This is not closely related to Bayesian updating of a belieffu nction [Kyburg, 87; Jatfray, 92] The
Definition: Product Subsets
Let s be a multiple source structure. A is said to be a product subset of n• (with respect to s) if A= TiiE tfJ• Ai for some 0;iAi �Of (i E ,P').
Note that such a representation, if it exists, is unique. For product subset A of 03 and i E ,P', we will write Ai as the projection of A into Of.
The following is a straight-forward extension of the Bayesian conditioning of a source structure.
Definition: Bayesian Conditioning of a Multiple Source Structure
Let s be a multiple source structure and let A be a product subset of Q3 such that Pt(A;);iO for all i E 'lj;'. Then the multiple source structure s� is defi ned as follows: s� has domain '1/J$ and, for i E '1/J', s�(i) = (s(i))�.
CONSTRAINTS AND ASSUMPTIONS ON C-RULES
In this section we introduce two clearly natural con straints on C-rules, and two arguably reasonable as sumptions. It is shown that together these determine a unique C-rule, which turns out to be Dempster's C rule, hence justifying Dempster's rule.
Constraint: Respecting Contradictions
C-rule 1r is said to respect contradictions if for any combinable multiple source structure s and w E n•, if P(w) = 0 then 7r3(w) = 0.
If I' ( w) :::: 0 then w cannot be true since w true im plies J• (w) true, and 0 represents the contradictory proposition. Therefore any sensible C-rule must re spect contradictions.
Constraint: Respecting Zero Probabilities
C-rule 1r is said to respect zero probabilities if for any combinable multiple source structure s and w E 0', if Pi(w;) = 0 for some i E '1/J', then 1!'1(w) = 0.
If Pf ( w;) = 0 for some i then w; is considered impossi ble (since frames are finite), so, since w is the conjunc tion of the propositions w;, w should clearly have zero probability.
Note that if we missed out the condition that the mul tiple source structure had to be 'combinable' in these two constraints and in the definition of a C-rule then these two constraints are inconsistent: for any C-rule 1r and any multiple source structure s which is not com binable, if 1r respects contradictions and zero proba-bilities then 7r8 (w) = 0 for any w E !.l", which is incon sistent with 1r8 being a probability function.
Definition
Let s be a multiple source structure, k E 1/J", and I E !.lt. Then
Ei is defined to be {wE n• : w(k) =I}, and -.Ei is defined to be {wE n• : w(k)fl}, i.e., !.l"\Ei. The set Ei is the cylindrical extension in n• of I ( E !.lt), and can be thought of as expressing the event that variable k takes the value l.
Definition: Assumption (A)
C-rule 1r is said to satisfy assumption (A) if 7r respects zero probabilities and, for any combinable multiple source structure s, for any k E 1/J", I E !.lt such that 7r8(.6.)f0, where .6. = -.EL,
Note that since 7r respects zero probabilities, if 7r"(.6.)f0 then Pk(.6.k)f0, so s� is defined.
In fact it can be shown that if 7r satisfi es assumption (A) then it satisfies a more general form of the assump tion where .6. is allowed to be an arbitrary product subset of n·.
Assumption (A) can be thought of as postulating that Bayesian conditioning commutes with source structure combination.
Bayesian conditioning by -.Ei can be viewed (roughly speaking) as omitting the lth focal element from the kth Belief function (and scaling up the other masses). Assumption (A) amounts to saying that it should not make any difference whether we omit that focal ele ment before, or after, combination.
Definition: Assumption (B)
Let s be a combinable multiple source structure such that, for some k E 1/J", l O t i = 2 and l O ti= 1 fori E 1/J" \ {k}, and l"(w)f0 for wE n•.
Then for IE !.lt,
The notation hides the simplicity of this assumption. The multiple source structures referred to are of a very simple kind: one of the component source structures has just two elements in its underlying space, and so leads to a belief function with at most two focal ele men�s, and all the other component source structures give belief functions with just one focal element, so they can be viewed as just propositions, i.e., certain evidences; furthermore there is no confl ict in the evi dences. In terms of belief functions this is the situation where we are conditioning a belief function with two masses by a subset of e.
Assumption (B) is just that adding all the other cer tain sources does not change the probabilities of com ponent k. The rationale behind this assumption is that the certain evidences are not in conflict with the in formation summarised by the kth source structure, so why should they change the probabilities?
Theorem 7r DS is the unique C-rule respecting contradictions, zero probabilities and satisfying (A) and (B).
This means that Dempster's rule of combination uniquely satisfi es our constraints and assumptions, hence justifying it.
Sketch of Proof
Unfortunately the proof of this theorem is far too long to be included here. To give the reader some idea of the structure of the proof, it will be briefly sketched.
It can easily be checked that 7rDS satisfi es the con straints and assumptions. Conversely, let 7r be an ar bitrary C-rule satisfying the constraints and assump tions. First, it is shown that 7r satisfi es a more gen eral form of (A), where .6. is allowed to be an arbi trary product subset of n•. This is then applied to the case of .6. = {w, w'} where w and w' differ in only one co-ordinate. In conjunction with assumption (B) this enables us to show that, when the denominators are non-zero, 1r"(w) _ 1r8(w') 7r_ bs (w) -7r.bs (w') .
A source structure over e is said to be discounted if e is a focal element of it, and a multiple source structure is said to be discounted if each of the source structures of which it is composed is discounted. It is then shown that, for any discounted multiple source structure s, 7r8 = 7r_ b8, using the last result repeatedly. The theorem is then proved by taking an arbitrary combinable multiple source structure t, discounting it to form s (see [Shafer, 76a] ) and using the more general form of assumption (A) again to relate 7rt and 7r8 7r.bs.
DISCUSSION
Both assumptions (A) and (B) seem fairly reasonable.
(A) appears to be an attractive property of a C-rule, but is a rather strong one, and it is not currently clear to me in which situations it should hold (it is conceiv able that there are other reasonable-seeming principles with which it is sometimes in conflict). Further work should attempt to clarify exactly when both assump tions are reasonable.
There are cases where Dempster's rule can seem un intuitive, for example, I argued in [Wilson, 92b ] that Dempster's rule is unreasonable at least for some in stances of Bayesian belief funct i ons, and there has been much criticism of certain examples of the use of the rule e.g., [Pearl, 90a, 90b; Walley, 91; Voorbraak, 91; Zadeh, 84] _7
If it does turn out that there are certain types of belief functions where assumption (A) or (B) is not reason able, then the above theorem, as it stands, is not use ful. However, an examination of its proof reveals that only two operations on belief functions/source struc tures are used-Bayesian conditioning (i.e, omitting focal elements and scaling the others up) and discount ing (i.e, adding a focal element equal to the frame e, and scaling the others down). This means that the proof could be used to justify Dempster's rule for any sub-class of belief functions/source structures (for which (A) and (B) may be more reasonable) which is closed under these operations, for example the set of simple support functions or the set of consonant sup port functions. Also, for the same reason, the proof could be used to justify Dempster's rule for collections of belief functions/multiple source structures s such that l3(w)-:j:.0 for all wE f23, if (A) and (B) were con sidered reasonable here.
It might also be interesting to investigate alternatives to (B), which give different values for 11'3(Ek) than those given in (B). The proof of the theorem can be modified to show that there is at most one C-rule satisfying the constraints and assumptions, though of course it will not be the Dempster C-rule.
